Abstract
Introduction
Static type systems have been proposed in recent years for the Java programming language [19] or its derivatives [10] in order to enforce access control and confinement properties [34, 20, 36, 37, 1, 2, 3, 16, 30, 35] . These type systems are usually designed for the source language, and intended to be enforced by the code producer at compile time. In many cases, the soundness of the type analyses is evaluated in a high-level core calculus, such as Featherweight Java (FJ) [23] , that captures the essence of the source language. An objection to this approach is that, in a Java-like platform, in which code units are shipped and dynamically loaded as bytecode, program verification that is performed against source code, or administrated only by the code producer, cannot be trusted [28, 27] . In order for the code consumer to enforce the typing discipline, it must be preserved at the level of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) bytecode language [26] . Unfortunately, because of the lack of structured control flow, especially in the presence of subroutines that do not conform to the last-in-first-out discipline, and also because of the complexity of data flow between the local variable array and the operand stack, formulating sound static analysis at the bytecode level is a daunting task [31] . Formal verification, however, has proven to be necessary when one works at the bytecode level, as security holes in early implementation of the JVM bytecode verifier were uncovered by formalizing type systems for non-trivial fragments of the JVM bytecode language [33, 17, 18] . Still, it is counter-productive for the designer of a bytecode-level type system to address the full complexity of the JVM execution environment in the early stage of design.
In this work, a lightweight modeling tool, Featherweight JVM, is proposed for evaluating bytecode-level, type-based protection mechanisms in an early design stage. In the style of Security Automata [32, 11] , Featherweight JVM (or FJVM) is an event model that tracks interprocedural access events generated by a JVM-like environment, and simulates their effects on the global VM state. Specifically, Featherweight JVM captures the following aspects of a JVM-like run time:
• FJVM abstracts away the complex structure of intraprocedural control flow (e.g., subroutines, unstructured branching, etc), but explicitly models the evolution of the run-time stack.
• FJVM abstracts away data flow between the local variable array and operand stack, but explicitly models data dependencies via type-based instrumentation.
• FJVM abstracts away destructive updates, but explicitly models reachability (i.e., may reach) and confine-ment (i.e., must not reach) in a (possibly cyclic) object graph.
• FJVM abstracts away the concrete identity of methods and fields, but explicitly models execution context and link context.
The basic VM model can be customized by a domainspecific safety policy, which further constrains the access event sequences produced by the VM. Adopting the information restriction approach of [11] , such a policy may only control access by consuming information made available by type instrumentation and static annotation. Safety policies thus formulated model the effect of imposing a typebased protection mechanism on the run-time environment.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the target protection mechanism, security theorems in the form of state invariants can then be proven for the policy-guarded VM model. Although such a modeling exercise does not establish the soundness of a bytecode-level type system, it provides a manageable formal model for articulating the structure of the wouldbe type system and the shape of its soundness proof, and does so without overwhelming the designer with the full complexity of the JVM bytecode language. The question answered by Featherweight JVM is not "Is the type system sound?", but rather "Suppose my type-based protection mechanism indeed restricts the VM in a certain way, what security theorems can I establish?" To demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach, a safety policy for Vitek et al's Confined Types [34, 20, 36, 37] has been formulated in Featherweight JVM, and a corresponding confinement theorem for the safety policy has been established. To reduce the amount of dynamic class loading required for type checking, the safety policy has been reformulated to reflect a capability-based implementation of Confined Types. The reformulation has been shown to preserve the confinement theorem. These results provide first evidence on the utility of Featherweight JVM as an early modeling tool for evaluating type-based protection mechanisms in a JVM-like environment.
Related Work
This work is related to various efforts in the formal modeling of the JVM and its bytecode verification process. Due to the vastness of the literature on this topic, the reader is referred to Hartel and Moreau's comprehensive survey [22] and the special issue of Journal of Automated Reasoning on Java Bytecode Verification [29] . The goal of this work, however, differs from previous efforts. While previous work aims at providing increasingly accurate and comprehensive models of the JVM, the present work strives to distill the essence This work is similar in its goal to calculi such as FJ [23] and MJ [5] , that is, to provide a manageable formal model for studying new language features. In fact, a design criterion of FJVM has been the following: "How do we expose enough details of the JVM to facilitate the reasoning of access control and confinement properties, while keeping the complexity of the resulting model similar to that of FJ?" Thus, inspired by FJ, FJVM is "functional" in the sense that destructive updates to object fields is not modeled. Links may be introduced by the put event, but thereafter immutable. Again, like FJ, FJVM focuses on a few interprocedural access events, such as object initialization, field access, dynamic method dispatching, and dynamic type casting. However, FJVM differs from FJ in important aspects. The operational semantics of FJ models the reduction of terms. As FJ terms are inductively specified, the resulting object graph is acyclic. FJVM execution, however, can spawn object graphs of arbitrary topology. Reachability and confinement properties thus obtained are more general and natural. Accessibility invariants for FJ are sometimes expressed in terms of a relation between a term and its subterms [36, 37] . In FJVM they are expressed as properties of the run-time stack.
Featherweight JVM can be seen as an instance of Security Automata [32] . The latter and its variants [4, 24, 25, 11] have been employed to characterize security policies. Fong [11] characterizes safety policies by the kind of information consumed by their enforcing protection mechanisms. This work is an attempt to employ the same information restriction principle to model the effect of imposing a typebased protection mechanism on JVM-like environments. We achieve this by restricting safety policies to only consume information made available by a specific style of type instrumentation and static annotation. The resulting model does not account for all possible type analyses, as that has never been our goal. On the contrary, [21] attempts to characterize the classes of all safety policies enforceable by various enforcement mechanisms, including static analysis as a special case.
This work is also related to Foster et al's theory of type qualifiers [14, 15] , in that FJVM attempts to provide a framework in which to evaluate augmented type systems at the bytecode level. While FJVM does not mandate any type-theoretic structure on its instrumentation process and safety policies, Foster et al's work articulates a well thought out theory on a family of qualifier-based augmented type systems. This work may be seen as a first step to the development of an analogous theory for the JVM bytecode language (see Sect. 6).
Confined Types [34, 20, 36, 37] is originally proposed to provide a stronger measure of encapsulation than what is available in the standard Java type system. The design goal is to avoid software vulnerabilities caused by reference
r is a fresh object reference from O Π, Γ; Φ, A, σ → Π ∪ {r : B}, Γ; Φ ∪ {r : B}, A, σ (NEW) [36, 37] . The second, capability-based formulation (Fig. 7) is, to our best knowledge, original. The latter formulation renders type checking modular. A prototype of such a type checker has been implemented [13] in the framework of Pluggable Verification Modules [12] . The modeling exercise in Sect. 5.3 allowed us to uncover and correct some subtle bugs in the implementation.
A Basic Model of the JVM

The Model
A basic model of the JVM is given in Fig. 1 . In the style of Security Automata [32, 11] , the model is a nondeterministic production system that describes how the VM state evolves over time in reaction to access events. Nondeterminism is employed because we are not modeling the execution of one particular bytecode program, but rather all possible access events that may be generated by the VM when well-typed bytecode sequences are executed.
Reference Types and Object References
In the VM model of Fig. 1 are two kinds of entities -reference types and their instances. It is assumed that there is a set C of raw reference types 1 , which are class and interface types, without genericity. Generic types are source level constructs that do not play a part in bytecode execution. Array types are not modeled, but can be added back to the model with ease. Metavariables A, B, C ∈ C denote typical instances of C. To simplify the notation, we write C as a shorthand 2 for the list C 1 , . . . , C k . As usual, A <: B denotes the subtyping of reference types. It is also assumed that there is a set O of object references. Metavariables p, q, r ∈ O denote typical instances of object references. Every object reference r is an instance of a unique class C. An object may contain an arbitrary number of typed fields, some of which are inherited from the supertypes of its class. Each field in turn stores an object reference. Inspired by FJ, a field may only be instantiated once but never updated. The null reference is modeled by the absence of link. As well, fields are distinguishable only up to their declaring classes.
VM State
A VM state is a configuration Π, Γ; Φ, A, σ. The components to the left of the semicolon model the current state of the heap, while those to the right models the stack of the executing thread.
Heap
The object pool Π is a finite set of allocations r : C. Intuitively, Π records all the objects that have been created by the VM, together with their classes. The judgment Π ⊢ r : C means that the allocation r : C is a member of the object pool Π. The link graph Γ is a finite set of links p : B ; q : C. A link p : B ; q : C records that the object p contains a field declared in reference type B, with field type C, storing the object reference q. The judgment Γ ⊢ p : B ; q : C indicates that the link is a member of the link graph. Together Π and Γ models the global state of the heap.
Stack
The VM state components Φ, A, σ model the stack of the current thread of execution. At the top of the stack is a stack frame Φ and an execution context A. A stack frame is a finite set of labeled references r : C. Such a set models the references accessible in a JVM stack frame. The internal structure of the JVM stack frame is not modeled, because the data flow between the local variable array and the operand stack is not our concern. As well, each reference r is associated with a type label C. We will return to this point in the following. The judgment Φ ⊢ r : C asserts that the labeled reference r : C is a member of Φ. The execution context A is the class in which the executing method is declared. Consequently, methods are distinguishable only up to their declaring classes. The last component σ models the call chain that leads to the current VM state. It has the following structure.
Essentially, a proper stack is either an empty stack, ⋄, or a non-empty stack, push(Φ, A, C, σ), where Φ is the caller stack frame, A is the execution context of the caller (i.e., the class in which the caller method is declared), C is the declared return type of the callee method, and σ is another proper stack.
Instrumentation
The VM model is instrumented. As mentioned before, every reference r stored in a stack frame Φ is tagged by a type label C, as in Φ ⊢ r : C. The basic type labeling as described here and the custom instrumentation as we will see in the next section share the following assumptions:
1. The VM is equipped with some form of type-based protection mechanism (e.g., a type system in the style of [33, 17, 18] ) that assigns to every program point in an execution trace a type state.
2. The said protection mechanism ensures that only some "safe" subset of execution traces will be generated. This subset is described in terms of constraints over the type states of consecutive program points in execution traces.
Many of the antecedents of the transition rules in Fig. 1 are intended to model the screening effect of this protection mechanism. The goal of this paper, as pointed out in the introduction, is not to evaluate the soundness of the protection mechanism: i.e., whether it indeed generates the mentioned subset of execution traces and assigns the right type states to the program points in the traces. Instead, the goal of modeling here is to explore if the subset of execution traces as specified by the model preserves a given safety property. This paper argues that such a verification step is relatively lightweight and provides quick feedback to the designer of a protection mechanism before a full-scale soundness proof is attempted.
Transition Rules
The transition rules in Fig. 1 define the state transition relation →. The production (WIDEN) "promotes" the type label of an object reference in the stack frame. This rule does not model a physical VM event, but instead captures the standard notion of subsumption. The transition rule (NEW) creates a fresh object reference in the
Figure 2. Type Safety Judgments
object pool, and makes that reference accessible in the top stack frame. The rule (CAST) models dynamic type casting, and tags an object reference in the stack frame with an alternative type label consistent with the actual class of the object reference. The production (GET) models field getting, and makes the target of an existing link accessible in the current stack frame if the source of that link is accessible. The production (PUT) models field setting, and creates a link between two object references accessible in the current stack frame. The transition rule (INVOKE) models dynamic method dispatching: the caller invokes a method declared in reference type B, with the actual dispatched method defined in reference type B ′ . The transition pushes a new stack frame (Φ ′ ), passes the receiver (r 0 : C 0 ) and the arguments (r : C) from the caller stack frame (Φ) to the callee stack frame (Φ ′ ), and constrains the return type (C). The transition rule (RETURN) pops the top stack frame (Φ ′ ), resurrects the stack frame (Φ) of the caller (A), and makes the return value (r : C) available in the caller stack frame.
A Type Safety Invariant
This section demonstrates that the basic VM model preserves a notion of type safety: the type instrumentation in the model is always consistent with the actual class of allocated objects. To this end, a number of type safety judgments are defined in Fig. 2 . The judgment SafeState asserts that a VM state is type safe. It is defined in terms of four auxiliary judgments. The SafeHeap judgment ensures that every object in the heap has a unique class. The SafeLinks judgment ensures that the links in the link graph are well formed, in the sense that an object only contains fields declared in, or inherited by, the class of the object, and that objects are stored only in compatibly typed fields. The pair of judgments SafeFrame and SafeStack ensure that the stack frames in the run-time stack contain only type labels consistent with the references they annotate. A notion of type soundness can be proven for the productions on the basic model.
Theorem 1 (One-Step Soundness)
A proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.
Custom Instrumentation and Policy Enforcement
The basic VM model provides a framework in which to articulate the dynamic behavior of the JVM. Our original goal, however, is to evaluate the effect of constraining the VM behavior, and see if the constraints are strong enough to uphold a given security property. To this end, the basic VM model is elaborated into the guarded VM model of Fig. 3 , which explicitly provides "hooks" for introducing behavioral constraints that are expressed in terms of domain-specific instrumentation.
Field and method designators
In the basic VM model, fields and methods are distinguishable only up to their declaring classes. In some verification domains, one may desire further differentiation (e.g., based on static annotations). It is thus assumed that fields are partitioned into a finite or countably infinite number of equivalence classes (e.g., public, protected, package private, and private). Fields belonging to the same equivalence class are indistinguishable from the perspective of policy enforcement. The exact set of equivalence classes is domain-dependent. Each equivalence class is identified by a unique field designator. We postulate that there is a finite or countably infinite set F of field designators, and use metavariables f, g to denote its members. Method designators m, n ∈ M are defined in a similar manner.
A number of notational revisions are necessitated by the introduction of field and method designators. Firstly, links are now annotated by field designators, as in p : B f ; q : C. With annotated links, the transition rules (GET) and (PUT) in Fig. 3 are now aware of the designator of the fields that are being accessed. (When |F| = 1 for a verification domain, the link annotation can be omitted.) Secondly, the execution context of a method is identified not only by the class in which the method is declared, but also its method Annotated type labels Recall that references accessible from a stack frame is labeled by a type label, as in Φ ⊢ r : C. We now allow the instrumentation process to track data dependencies via the use of type annotations. Specifically, type annotations α, β, γ ∈ A can be used to decorate the type labels of object references stored in a stack frame, as in Φ ⊢ r : C γ . Whenever a labeled reference is introduced into the top stack frame, as in the cases of (WIDEN), (NEW), (CAST) and (GET), a type annotation is attached to the type label. The type annotation is erased when the labeled reference is stored into a field via (PUT). The most complex of all the transition rules are the pair (INVOKE) and (RETURN). As in other transition rules, when arguments (r : C γ ) are passed into the callee stack frame (Φ ′ ), their type labels acquire a new set of type annotations (r : C β ).
These annotations may differ from those in the caller stack frame (Φ). When a method returns, the return value (r) is introduced into the caller stack frame (Φ), and as such its type label (C) receives a new type annotation (γ) that may differ from the one (β) in the callee stack frame (Φ ′ ). The tricky point is that the type annotation of the return object reference is decided at the time when the method is invoked (just as the type label of the return reference is decided at method invocation time). In the basic model of Fig. 1 , method invocation pushes into the run-time stack the return type label C. In the new model, a doubly decorated type label C β/γ is pushed into the stack. The meaning is that (1) the callee must return an object reference with annotated type label C β , and that (2) the returned object reference will be pushed into the caller stack frame with annotated type label C γ . The transition rules (INVOKE) and (RETURN) are designed to jointly produce this behavior. (As usual, if |A| = 1 then all type annotations may be omitted.)
Policy enforcement
The ultimate goal of the aforementioned apparatus is to allow us to control the execution traces that the VM generates. In the guarded VM model, the transition relation → Σ is now parameterized by a safety policy Σ. A safety policy is a function with signature C × M → 2 E , where 2 E denotes the powerset of the set of events E that may be generated by the VM. Intuitively, a policy Σ specifies for each execution context A.m the set Σ[A.m] of permitted events. An event e ∈ E has the following structure.
The guarded model in Fig. 3 ensures that every transition produced by → Σ satisfies the parameter policy Σ. One may instantiate the model by a concrete policy, and then verify if some global safety property (in the form of a state invariant) is preserved by the transitions. Following the spirit of [11] , we constrain the kind of information that may be consumed by the underlying protection mechanism for the purpose of access control. Event signatures have been carefully designed so that a safety policy may only control execution by examining type instrumentation and static annotation. Two transitions involving the same type instrumentation and static annotation are indistinguishable from the point of view of the safety policy. Information such as object identity, dynamic types and link graph topology are intentionally hidden from the protection mechanism. This set up allows us to model the effect of imposing a purely type-based protection mechanism.
Example: Confined Types
In this section, we look at how Featherweight JVM may be used to evaluate a realistic type system with security application. Specifically, we will examine two formulations of Confined Types, and attempt to establish a Confinement Theorem for each formulation. This modeling exercise allows us to point out a number of subtle implementation issues if Confined Types is to be enforced at the bytecode level.
Confined Types from 20,000 Feet
At the core of the Java security infrastructure is a strong type system, which provides non-bypassable encapsulation boundaries for controlling access to privileged services and sensitive data. To appreciate the connection between encapsulation and security, recall that the soundness of the JVM type system guarantees no type confusion may occur, and thus the security manager is properly encapsulated, and consequently the rest of the Java protection infrastructure can function as designed. Both the Java source language and the JVM bytecode language support access control modifiers (e.g., public, protected, etc) for enforcing the usual notion of data encapsulation. The standard Java platform, however, offers no provision for enforcing the stronger notion of reference encapsulation. The lack of programmatic support for preventing accidental reference leaking has led to a security breach in the java.security package of JDK 1.1 [34] .
C1 A confined type must not appear in the type of a public (or protected) field or the return type of a public (or protected) method.
C2 A confined type must not be public.
C3
Methods invoked on an expression of confined type must either be defined in a confined class or be anonymous methods.
C4 Subtypes of a confined type must be confined.
C5 Confined types can be widened only to other confined types.
C6 Overriding must preserve anonymity of methods.
A1
[In an anonymous method,] the this reference is used only to select fields and as the receiver in the invocation of other anonymous methods.
Figure 4. Type Rules for Confined Types [37]
The idea of Confined Types [34, 20, 36, 37] was proposed as a lightweight annotation system for supporting reference encapsulation in a Java-like safe language. It has been shown convincingly that proper adoption of confined types in Java could have prevented the aforementioned security breach [34] . A class or interface type may be declared to be confined. The typing discipline ensures the following property.
Confinement Property (Informal) [36, 37] An object of
confined type is encapsulated within its defining scope [i.e., package].
Confined Types enforces the typing discipline of Fig. 4 (adopted from [37] , with minor editing). The idea of an anonymous method requires explanation. A confined object may be leaked outside of its package when it acts as the receiver (i.e., this) of a method invocation in which the dispatched method is one that has been inherited from a non-confined superclass. Completely disallowing this will render the typing discipline too restrictive. The idea of an anonymous method is therefore introduced. Essentially, an anonymous method promises the classes which inherit the method that the this reference will never be stored into a field. As such, method anonymity is closely related to the Boyland's borrowed receiver [6] .
A Safety Policy for Confined Types
We encode the the type rules of Fig. 4 into a safety policy for Featherweight JVM (Fig. 5) .
Notation
Reference types are either public or package private. We use the predicate public(C) to assert that C is public. Following [36, 37] , type rule C2 is modeled by identifying the package private classes with the confined classes. The following shorthand is therefore defined:
We write B ≈ C to assert that reference types B and C belong to the same package. We define the relation, C ⊲ B to assert that C is visible to B.
C ⊲ B public(C) ∨ B ≈ C
We also define a transitive variant of the visibility relation:
The following properties can be easily verified:
We postulate that the underlying protection mechanism enforces type rule C4 when a class is defined by a class loader:
Following [36, 37] , all fields and methods are assumed to be public to simplify discussion. A field (or method) is encapsulated by being declared in a confined reference type.
To facilitate the enforcement of the type rules C3 and A1, method designators are defined to indicate if a given method is anonymous:
No field designator needs to be defined, and thus we will omit field designators in our further discussion. Three type annotations are defined to track if a given reference is the this pseudo-parameter of a method:
α, β, γ ::= ⊤ | this | this
The type annotation ⊤ indicates no information for the underlying reference. A subsumption relation ⊏: is defined for the type annotations, so that ⊏: is a partial ordering with ⊤ being the maximal element: 
Safety Policy
A safety policy for Confined Types is formulated in Fig. 5 . The type rule C1 is enforced by the antecedent C ◮ B of the get, put and invoke policy rules, ensuring that confined objects are never exposed by an unprotected field or returned by an unprotected method. The type rule C3 is enforced in the invoke policy rule by the antecedent (C 0 ◮ B ∧ . . .) ∨ n = anon, which requires that a confined receiver can temporarily escape from its confinement domain only if the invoked method is anonymous. The widen and cast policy rules enforce a slightly relaxed version of C5, so that a confined reference may be widened or casted to a non-confined one only if it is the anonymous this.
The type rule C6 is enforced in the invoke policy rule by the antecedent n = anon ⇒ n ′ = anon, which mandates that method dispatching preserves anonymity in the execution context. To enforce type rule A1, the antecedent γ = this ∨ m = anon is required in the put policy rule so that an anonymous method cannot store this into a field. Similarly, the antecedent ∀i > 0 . (. . . ∧ (γ i = this ∨ m = anon)) disallows the passing of an anonymous this as method arguments. Within the same policy rule, the antecedent β = this ∨ n ′ = anon forbids the returning of an anonymous this.
A number of subtle requirements in the policy of Fig. 5 are not explicitly mandated by the type rules of Fig. 4 . Nevertheless they are instrumental in the proof of the confine- in the invoke policy mandates that methods may only receive arguments from safe origins 3 . Furthermore, it is required that the anonymous this may be the receiver of a method call only if the target method is anonymous (see the antecedent (. . . ∧ (γ 0 = this ∨ m = anon)) ∨ n = anon of the invoke policy rule).
Confinement Theorem
The goal of imposing the safety policy of Fig. 5 is to ensure that the Confinement Property (Informal) of Sect. 5.1 is satisfied. Formally, given a VM state Π, Γ; Φ, A.m, σ, we want the following properties to hold:
Property (7) asserts that instances of confined classes are only stored in fields declared within the same package. Property (8) states that, except for an anonymous this, confined objects remains in the stack frame of methods declared in the same package. To enforce the above properties, we postulate the state invariant ConfinedState(Π, Γ; Φ, A.m, σ) as specified in Fig. 6 .
Proposition 2 If both SafeState(Π, Γ; Φ, A, σ)
and ConfinedState(Π, Γ; Φ, A.m, σ) hold, then properties (7) and (8) Analogous to One-Step Soundness (Theorem 1), the following Confinement Theorem can be proven:
See Appendix B for a proof of this theorem.
A Capability-Based Safety Policy for Confined Types
Motivation
The above formulation of Confined Types closely mirrors the type rules of Fig. 4 . Although the safety policy in Fig. 5 successfully preserves the Confinement Property, the price of enforcing such a safety policy at link time is non-trivial. To understand this cost, a reference type C is said to be an auxiliary type for reference type A if C appears in the constant pool of A as a field type, or a method parameter or return type. To enforce the above safety policy at link time, auxiliary types for A must be loaded in order for the type checker to confirm their confined-ness. As the loading of auxiliary classes is not mandated by the JVM Specification [26] , such an eager class loading strategy could slow down the start up time of an application, and increase the memory footprint of the VM unnecessarily.
In this section, we explore an alternative formulation of Confined Types based on the notion of capability types [9, 7] . Intuitively, rather than relying on class loading to confirm the confined-ness of auxiliary types, every auxiliary type is explicitly annotated by a capability that provides an estimate of its confined-ness. Although the capabilities are only estimates, the design of the typing discipline is such that a classfile that is not honest about the annotations will fail to type check. 
Notation
A partially-ordered set of capabilities are defined to track the confined-ness of references.
The capability ⊥ is used for tagging references that are believed to be public, and the conf capability for confined references. References tagged with anon may temporarily escape from its confinement domain as a method receiver so long as it is never deposited into a field. We postulate that field types, method parameter types (including the pseudoparameter this) and method return types are all annotated with the these capabilities. Consequently, an anonymous method is represented by having this annotated by the anon capability. Method designators are therefore not needed in this model 4 . We, however, use field designators 4 A more accurate instantiation of the model would explicitly record the capability of the this formal parameter with a method designator. m, n ::= γ Under this set up the policy rule for invoke would look like the following:
The added notational complexity only plays a minor role in the confinement proof. Specifically, the antecedents C The default type label C * of a reference type C is defined as follows:
We define a variant of the visibility relation in terms of capability type annotations:
As before, a transitive variant of visibility is also defined:
The following properties can be easily validated:
Safety Policy
A capability-based safety policy for Confined Types is given in Fig. 7 . This policy is significantly cleaner than the previous one 5 . Notice that accesses are granted by examining not the actual confined-ness of auxiliary types (i.e., field types, and method parameter and return types), but rather type labels annotated with capabilities. This effectively cut down the amount of class loading required to type check a method body.
Confinement Theorem Revisited
The goal of confinement is still to uphold property (7), plus property (8) adapted as follows:
directly as an antecedent so that we do not need to carry a method designator in every execution context. 5 An alternative formulation of the invoke policy rule would have the antecedent ∀i > 0 . C ∀p, q, B, C . p :
ConfinedState cap (Π, Γ; Φ, A, σ)
Figure 8. Revised Confinement Judgments
To accommodate the variation in notation and confinement goals, the confinement invariant has been reformulated, as shown in Fig. 8 . Again, we assert that the invariant establishes the confinement goals.
Proposition 4 If both SafeState(Π, Γ; Φ, A, σ) and
ConfinedState cap (Π, Γ; Φ, A, σ) hold, then properties (7) and (17) hold.
Proof: Property (7) follows from ConfinedLinks cap (Γ | Π) and SafeLinks(Γ | Π) via (10), (11) , (6), (2) , and (3). Property (8) follows from ConfinedFrame cap (Φ | Π, A) via (14) and (15) .
A revised confinement theorem can be proven:
See Appendix C for the proof of this theorem.
Benefits of Reformulation
We started by promising that the capability-based reformulation reduces the amount of class loading performed by the link-time type checking algorithm. With the original formulation, every time the checks C ◮ B and C ⊲ B are carried out, class loading must be performed in order for the type checker to figure out the confined-ness of the classes C and B. With the capability-based reformulation, class loading is not always necessary. For example, checking C γ ◮: B β sometimes only involves the comparison of capability labels. It is only when (i) both γ and beta are conf, (ii) the fully qualified names of B and C are different, and (iii) B and C share the same name qualification, that we need to load the definitions of B and C to verify if they belong to the same run-time package 6 . Class loading can be avoided in other cases.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we proposed a lightweight formal model of JVM-like environments for evaluating the effectiveness of type-based protection mechanisms at an early stage of design. We presented a rational reconstruction of Confined Types at the JVM bytecode level, and verified that our formulation successfully enforces the Confinement Property. We then articulate a capability-based reformulation of Confined Types that can reduce the amount of class loading at type checking time. The Confinement Property is preserved by this alternative formulation. We have therefore provided first evidence on the utility of FJVM as a tool for lightweight evaluation of type-based protection mechanisms.
We plan to explore a number of future directions. Firstly, we are particularly interested in the application of typebased access control mechanisms to enforce security properties [2, 35] at the bytecode level. We plan to use Featherweight JVM as a model to validate early designs. Secondly, we plan to expand our model to cover Java features such as exception handling and arrays, and to explore the encoding of source-level generic types [8, 23] in FJVM type annotations. Thirdly, we want to devise a semantic linkage between FJVM and a bytecode-level type system in the style of [33, 17, 18] , so that results established in FJVM may be transferred to the bytecode-level type system.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
A sketch of the proof for Theorem 1 is given in this appendix. We check SafeState(Π ′ , Γ; Φ ′ , A ′ , σ ′ ) by a case analysis on the transition rule (Fig. 1) employed to obtain
Case (WIDEN):
To show SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {r : B} | Π), notice that SafeFrame(Φ | Π) ensures C ′ <: C if C ′ is the class of r. As (WIDEN) guarantees C <: B, we obtain, by transitivity, C ′ <: B as required.
Case (NEW):
Because r is a fresh object reference from O, SafeHeap(Π ∪ {r : B}) holds trivially. As well, SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {r : B} | Π ∪ {r : B}) holds because B <: B.
Case (CAST):
To see SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {r : B} | Π), observe that (CAST) explicitly requires the antecedents Π ⊢ r : C ′ and C ′ <: B.
Case (GET):
To see SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {q : C} | Π), notice that (GET) guarantees Γ ⊢ p : B ; q : C, which, by
Case (PUT):
We show SafeLinks(Γ ∪ {p : B ; q :
′ implies B ′ <: B 0 . As (PUT) guarantees B 0 < B, the latter in turn implies B ′ <: B as required.
Case (INVOKE):
We need to show SafeFrame(Φ ′ | Π) and SafeStack(σ ′ | Π). 
Case (RETURN):
Firstly, SafeStack(σ | Π) is guaranteed by SafeStack(push(Φ, A, C, σ) | Π) .
Secondly, we show SafeFrame(Φ ∪ {r : C} | Π).
Because SafeFrame(Φ | Π) is guaranteed by SafeStack(push(Φ, A, C, σ) | Π), it suffices to show that Π ⊢ r : C ′ implies C ′ <: C. The implication is ensured by SafeFrame(Φ ′ | Π).
B. Proof of Theorem 3
A sketch of the proof for Theorem 3 is given in this appendix. We check ConfinedState(Π ′ , Γ ′ ; Φ ′ , A ′ .m ′ , σ ′ ) by a case analysis on the transition rule ( 
Case (WIDEN):
We show ConfinedFrame(Φ ∪ {r : B β } | Π, A.m) in 2 steps. First, the widen policy rule guarantees that B ⊲ A. Second, by ConfinedFrame(Φ | Π, A.m), Φ ⊢ r : C γ and Π ⊢ r : C ′ jointly imply that either (i) C ′ ◮ C or (ii) (γ = this ∧ m = anon). If case (i) holds, then the widen policy rule ensures that C ◮ B ∨(β = this∧m = anon), and thus by (2) we deduce (C ′ ◮ B ∨ (γ = this ∧ m = anon)) as required. Otherwise, case (ii) holds. Because the widen policy rule ensures that γ ⊏: β, we deduce (β = this ∧ m = anon) as required.
Case (NEW):
ConfinedFrame(Φ ∪ {r : B} | Π ∪ {r : B β }, A.m) holds 7 , because (i) the new policy rule mandates that B ⊲ A, and (ii) B ◮ B by (1).
Case (CAST):
Similar to (WIDEN).
Case (GET):
We show ConfinedFrame(Φ ∪ {q : C γ } | Π, A.m) in 2 steps. First, the get policy rule ensures 8 that C ◮ B and B ⊲ A. Thus, by (5), we have C ⊲ A as required. Second, ConfinedLinks(Γ | Π) guarantees that Γ ⊢ p : B ; q : C and Π ⊢ q : C ′ jointly imply C ′ ◮ C as required. As well, both (β = this ∨ n ′ = anon) and γ = this are antecedents of the invoke policy rule. What remains to be shown is C ⊲ A, which, by (5), follows from C ◮ B and B ⊲ A, both being antecedent of the invoke policy rule.
Case (RETURN):
We But then 9 The antecedent B ⊲ A in the put policy rule is not needed for establishing the Confinement Theorem. It is introduced for symmetry. 
